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This paper examines two recent developments in immigration law
in Western liberal democracies: security exclusions and forced
marriage provisions. It aims to consider how both of these
settings are inﬂuenced by a pernicious Islamophobia and by
gender. And, of course, by the intersection that creates a
gendered version of Islamophobia. The overarching aim of the
work is to consider whether and how human rights arguments are
likely to be eﬀective in immigration law. The work proceeds by
developing the ideas of ‘unknowability’ and ‘unintelligibility’ as
two ways to describe how Western law responds to Islam, and in
so doing, contributes to Islamophobia.

Law; Islamophobia; security;
forced marriage; gender

As a legal scholar and migrant advocate, I am keenly interested in human rights – when
they work and when they fail. In migration law, rights arguments fail frequently. I remain
hopeful that if we can understand this failure better, we can mitigate against it, somehow.
My challenge here is to puzzle out the role that human rights arguments have had in confronting the pernicious Islamophobia which is one of the key markers of the contemporary
politics of immigration.
This paper evaluates the success of human rights arguments in confronting Islamophobia in immigration law. Taking two examples where there have been signiﬁcant legal
developments since the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the paper shows a
marked contrast between legal responses to security issues on the one hand and to
forced marriage on the other. Looking closely at these two instances, we ﬁnd that
human rights discourses lack nuance and create pressures tending towards ‘all-ornothing’ legal results. One of the important distinctions between the two settings is that
the security arena is almost entirely about men, and the forced marriage setting is
mostly about women. Figuring out how and why gender matters is an important starting
point for my analysis.
The insights that emerge from considering these two settings are complicated. Human
rights function quite diﬀerently in each example and the complications are partially about
gender, and partially about Islamophobia. I have analyzed the contrast by considering the
security problem as one of knowledge and the forced marriage problem as one of intelligibility. At the root of both problems is a profound failure on the part of many non-Muslim
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Western thinkers, policy makers, lawyers, and decision makers both to understand Islam
in a nuanced way and to admit a lack of understanding. Having already announced my
commitment to human rights and their inherent Westernized quasi-universalism, the
challenge here is to develop a way of talking about cultural diﬀerence meaningfully,
while simultaneously rejecting cultural relativism. The distinction between ‘knowability’
and ‘intelligibility’ is designed to set some guideposts within the realm of culture and to
distinguish diﬀerent reactions to cultural diﬀerence. Or, in other words, to breakdown
some of the ‘othering’ practices that paralyze good analysis. Focusing on gendered settings
exposes how Islamophobia becomes normalised in Western legal decision making.
I begin the paper by discussing Islamophobia and how knowability and intelligibility
help us to chart a path, before turning to my two exemplar cases, and ﬁnally attempting
to draw some conclusions. This paper began life as a chapter in a book about contemporary immigration politics (Dauvergne 2016). In this iteration, I am focusing on the questions that were left unanswered in that earlier writing. My conclusion is that the West’s
Islamophobia is gendered in ways that signiﬁcantly torque human rights arguments.
This conclusion can inform our use of human rights arguments, if we are able to honestly
embrace it. If we push it farther, it can tell us something about the encounters between
Islam and ‘The West’.
My focus in this paper is on immigration law and its regulation of entry and expulsion,
rather than on other legal frameworks that regulate belonging and presence (Dauvergne
2005; Geddes and Scholten 2016). In this setting, the state acting as a regulator emerges
inevitably as an un-nuanced trope. As I am examining Western liberal democracies, the
idea of a Western perspective is, in a short piece, a ﬂat trope. This is, of course, as problematic as Islamophobia itself, but the immigration law setting grants all power to the admitting state, including the power to leave its premises unexamined. One of the consequences
of focusing on the law in a short paper is that it leaves this ﬂat trope unexplored. This is
one aspect of the deep inequality that Owen theorises (2019).

Islamophobia in contemporary immigration politics
Islamophobia is not new to Western cultures. Contemporary Islamophobia’s antecedents
can be traced as far back as the Crusades, to a time when Western culture was emergent.
Islamic culture and religious tradition was part of the backdrop against which it became
possible to understand Western civilisation as a coherent entity (Rana 2007; Allen 2010;
Safeer Awan 2010). This lineage is important. Understanding its long-term contours
makes it possible to see both how and why the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
mark a turning point. The terrorist attacks of 2001 unleashed a fear of Islamic fundamentalism in Western societies (Ramirez, Hoopes, and Quinlan 2003; Morey and Yaquin 2011;
Elver 2012). This fear has freed Western politics from grappling with cultural relativism
and opened up a rhetorical space in which it seems permissible to prefer some cultures
to others.
Despite the enduring character of Islamophobia, the decade following the 9/11 terror
attacks brought an enormous cultural production of both anti-Islamic thought and inchoate fear, along with anxiety about both. Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order, published in 1996, experienced a revival and was
regarded as prescient. For Western populations, the War on Terror merged into the
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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, intertwined with the idea that this is about saving someone
else as much as it is about saving ourselves. Films ranging from the award-winning The
Hurt Locker, to the much-criticized Saving Jessica Lynch or the blockbuster Body of Lies
contributed to the cultural production of Islam. Locations like Abu-Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay became ﬁrmly anchored in the minds of Western publics. Five years after 9/11,
most educated citizens of the United States, Britain, or Australia probably knew more
about conditions in these prisons than in the penitentiaries and immigration detention
centres within their own states.
The early decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century have seen Islamophobia returned to the
centre of many Western cultures. Whether reviled as ignorant and racist, or embraced
as ordinary and ﬁnally out-in-the-open, the relationship between Islam and the West
has taken up a central space in many Western popular and political discourses. This
trend is proving a deﬁning feature of twenty-ﬁrst century Western politics, which
Donald Trump’s presidency with his controversial immigration politics is sure to exacerbate. It is likely not since the Crusades themselves that Islam has occupied such a prominent position in the Western imagination.
Despite all of the attention to Islam, not nearly enough detailed and nuanced knowledge has followed. As a result, many citizens of so-called Western states are becoming
acquainted not with Islamic cultures and the Muslim religious tradition, but with the caricatures of Islam produced within popular culture. Outside of the Muslim members of
Western elites, too few educated non-Muslim Western citizens have any idea at all how
to diﬀerentiate Islam from Islamic fundamentalism, even in a rudimentary way. This is
a primary source of Islamophobia, a shape-shifting category that can be broadly understood as an irrational suspicion, hatred, or fear of Muslims akin to racism but with sui
generis qualities.1 Like all irrational fears, Islamophobia draws strongly on ignorance.
At this point, then, we bump up against the twinned problems of the unknown and the
unintelligible. This is the juncture of what one does not know and what one cannot understand. Despite all of the attention to Islam over the past two decades, few non-Muslims in
Europe or North America, for example, can name the most important Muslim sects,
recount a basic history of the religion, tell you when Mohammad lived, or explain the
now pervasive concept of ‘radicalization’. This is a knowledge issue. The deeper and
more truly ‘cultural’ issue is that there is much about Islamic cultures that is so
diﬀerent from stereotypical Western experiences that it does not make sense even to
Western citizens who have crossed the knowledge threshold. True cultural diﬀerence is
about just this: diﬀerence that does not submit itself to coherent analysis through the
lens of the other. Both lack of knowledge and putative unintelligibility contribute to the
elision between fear of fundamentalism and Islamophobia. Even when we know these
two things are diﬀerent, many in the West do not know nearly enough to draw a line
between them.
Knowability and intelligibility mark two positions that recur in Western immigration
law’s responses to Muslim migrants. Focusing analysis on unknowability calls our attention to moments when legal decision makers move forward in the absence of knowledge.
Focusing on unintelligibility is somewhat diﬀerent as it draws attention to the moments
when decision makers stop short of trying to make sense of something because that something is ‘cultural’. Both unknowability and unintelligibility create gaps in understanding.
In these gaps, Islamophobia ﬂourishes.
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The 9/11 terrorist attacks made it permissible, even logical and rational, to be afraid. A
fear of religiously motivated terrorists is grounded in plenty of clear evidence that such
people do exist, and will pursue violent aims at any and all costs to themselves. There
has been a remarkable acceptance of full-body scanners, biometric passports, closed
circuit monitoring of public spaces, and the packaging of gels and liquids into minute
quantities in zip-lock bags for scrutiny at now endless airport security queues. The security
turn, its critique, and its political normalisation relate directly to fear of Islamic fundamentalism and fuel the broader Islamophobia (Gibney 2019; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008;
Roach 2011). While the new security measures have been employed liberally, it is no
secret which people we most imagine will be put on the ‘no ﬂy’ list. Recent research
about racial proﬁling shows that this stereotype has not dissipated in the years since 9/
11 (BC Civil Liberties 2010; Ontario Human Rights Commission 2017). The familiar processes of racism are being deployed in this setting with banal predictability (see also Owen
2019). The tiny grain of ‘rational’ fear, combined with the understanding that overreach is
essential to the logic of security, leads to an acceptance of heightened scrutiny and a willingness to be more tolerant of racial-proﬁling practices than in years past (Bennett 2008;
Schuck, Martin, and Glaser 2012).
The cultural production of Islamophobia and the welcoming of new security measures
directly aﬀect matters of immigration in Western liberal democracies. Immigration policy
is always a matter of national aspirations and national self-image and thus an irrational
fear linked to a group that can be deﬁned largely as non-citizens thrives here. As with
other aspects of this terrain, however, the immigration linkages are often light on facts.
For example, the number of Muslim migrants to Western states is lower than many
would expect (Pew 2011). I turn now to two recent immigration law settings where Islamophobia, growing in the spaces of unknowability and unintelligibility, looms large.

Indeﬁnite detention, masculinity, security
The security turn in immigration politics of Western liberal democracies began in the
1980s and 1990s with the emergence of the so-called ‘asylum crisis’. In the security
climate following 9/11, detention of suspected terrorists was the most high-proﬁle use
of immigration law in Western states. In the United Kingdom, Canada, and New
Zealand, cases reached the highest courts seeking clarity about the limits of immigration
law’s capacity to function in this manner. These rulings became the site for core statements
about national identity, security, the limits of human rights, and the value of citizenship. In
each case, the people detained were Muslim men. In the United States, the issue played out
somewhat diﬀerently as the political parallel came in the form of the Guantanamo Bayrelated cases, but it was still the case that ‘[i]mmigration policy rapidly became the
most visible domestic tool in the war on terror’ (Johnson 2013 at 1401, citing Kerwin).2
The rise of denationalisation that Gibney (2019) analyzes in this volume moved on a
closely parallel track.
Immigration law became an important location for terrorism concerns for two reasons.
The ﬁrst is straightforward: following the September 11 attacks, Western concerns about
terrorism were, rightly or wrongly, concerns about ‘elsewhere’ – the threat was outside, so
closing borders was a conceivable response to it. The second and more consequential
reason that immigration law became a focus of terrorism scrutiny is that immigration
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detention is usually considered to be ‘administrative’ detention. This means that people
can be detained under immigration law without being tried and convicted. Detaining
people without using criminal law is an anathema to core rule of law values.
In the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand, the story played out in broadly
similar ways: the government used provisions of the immigration law to achieve eﬀectively
indeﬁnite detention of Muslim men suspected of terrorist links and the result was a major
confrontation in the courts. Once in the courts, the responses varied, in part because of
diﬀering level of respect for international human rights commitments.3 The issue in all
cases is not discrimination on the face of the law but rather how and when government
oﬃcials and judges choose to use particular facially neutral provisions (see also Chung
2019; Boucher 2019, who make similar points).
These cases are a telling instance in the story of immigration law and the fear of fundamental Islam. In Canada, the case at the Supreme Court level concerned three men, each of
who were suspected of terrorist linkages or activities (it is impossible to know exactly what
because of the secrecy provisions). The evidence supposedly met the threshold for them to
be deported, but deportation was impossible because of the likelihood that their countries
of nationality would torture them or put them to death if they returned. Instead, they were
detained under the legal ﬁction that they were temporarily awaiting deportation. The
British case was based on almost identical facts. In New Zealand, the facts were slightly
diﬀerent as Mr. Zaoui had been a political candidate in his native Algeria, and thus had
a higher proﬁle at the outset. The security concerns (again, we do not know exactly
what) arose during his process of seeking refugee protection, and were equally mysteriously withdrawn ﬁve years later, allowing him to remain permanently in New Zealand.
In each case, the legal battle was protracted. Not only did the cases reach the highest appellate court, but they returned to that pinnacle repeatedly.
The cases speak powerfully to the problem of the unknowable. This is evident on a
surface level in the use of secret evidence provisions, deployed in all three countries. In
each case the state asserted that some evidence needed to be kept from the public in
the name of national security. In other words, that publics simply had to trust their governments to determine who was dangerous and who was not, based on information that
would never see the light of day. The political presumption of those supporting these
measures is that if the evidence were known, everyone would agree. In other words,
that the basic tenets of securitisation that lead to the quick acceptance of the body
scanner at the airport, would carry over to acceptance of indeﬁnite detention as well.
The more profound deployment of the unknowable, however, is that which overlaps
with both Islam and gender in these cases. Here the presumption is that some Muslim
men are terrorists and it is impossible to discern which ones. Legal argument is a poor
location in which to contest this construction and its intertwining of gender and security
threat. The use of secret evidence obscures this further. In Canada, 30 of 31 security certiﬁcate detainees have been men. In place of detailed intelligence and diligent policing, a
veneer of unknowability is asserted to placate public opinion. It is possible to unravel this
presumption with evidence, argument, and time, but the hegemony of Islamophobia
makes this unravelling diﬃcult, and sometimes impossible. In these security cases, the
unknown stands as a posture of wilful blindness. The answers to these questions (Who
is a danger? How can we prove it?) are much more ‘knowable’ than immigration law
requires. Immigration law needs less precision than criminal law and thus unknowability
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ﬂourishes here. In indeﬁnite immigration detention, suspicions and secret evidence suﬃce.
This bias towards substituting Islamophobia for knowledge ﬁts precisely into the framework that indeﬁnite immigration detention provides.
The fact that the detainees in these cases were all men is important. It ought not to be
sheeted home to a masculine propensity to violence. At the very least, it feeds on and
reinforces a stereotype of Muslim men. More signiﬁcantly it tips over into what
Miranda Fricker has called an ‘epistemic injustice’ that works within and alongside
Western Islamophobia, and impairs Western capacity to understand security threats
with more precision (Fricker 2007).
Finally, in these cases human rights arguments had some successes, but these were
limited in signiﬁcant ways. Not one of these cases relied successfully on the core texts
of the international human rights regime. Both refugee law (which was successful in
New Zealand) and the European Convention (which was partially successful in the
United Kingdom) are specialised regimes, and thus they provide important indicators
of when international human rights law will gain some traction: i.e. when a right is articulated as something ‘less’ than international and aimed at a group more speciﬁc than
‘humans’. Most shocking perhaps was the Canadian case where constitutionally enshrined
human rights proved no match for indeﬁnite detention on the basis of secret evidence. The
Supreme Court of Canada required some modiﬁcations to the law, but approved the
general framework of indeﬁnite detention for non-citizens suspected of terrorism on
the basis of evidence that is kept secret. In the context of immigration securitisation
human rights have become malleable to the politics of the day. Human rights have
proven to yield to unknowability.

Forced marriage, women, and the limits of intelligibility
Security detention forces us to come to terms with the draconian power of immigration
law, and to ask how far away from liberal commitments to personal liberty and privacy
liberal democracies are willing to travel. The story of these cases, therefore, tells us something about fear, about liberal states’ laws, and about human rights. But they do not require
us to come to terms with the putative unintelligibility that is at the vexing core of Islamophobia. Instead, they can be explained by attention to what is knowable and what is not,
and by wilful assertions of ‘unknowability’. Shifting focus to examine how forced marriage
has emerged as an immigration-linked concern in Western states, by contrast, moves the
conversation directly into the terrain of this veneer of unintelligibility.
By 2014, most Western liberal democracies had expressed oﬃcial concern about
forced marriage. Forced marriage is illegal (because all marriage requires consent of
both parties) and it is a human rights breach contravening no fewer than four
binding international human rights treaties, as well as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.4 The ﬁrst frissons of public concern about forced marriage began in
Europe in the 1990s. Two high-proﬁle stories of young girls abducted and forced into
marriages by their families made headlines in 1992 and 1997 respectively. In 1998,
Rukhsana Naz was killed by her mother and brother in Britain after seeking to leave a
marriage her family had forced upon her (Siddiqui 2005). European communities and
states responded to these actions with new laws and policies, ranging from new immigration provisions raising the age at which a spouse could be sponsored and introducing
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stricter scrutiny of marriage sponsorships in a variety of ways (Denmark, Norway), new
criminal provisions (Norway, Germany, Belgium), and new civil laws (France, Britain).
The most creative and extensive eﬀorts were those in Britain where a ‘Forced Marriage
Unit’ was established, initially within the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce and now
shared with the Home Oﬃce. The British trajectory was distinguished by strong involvement from grassroots feminist organisations, and a considered rejection of both immigration law reform and criminalisation options. Instead, innovative civil law reform
included extending the reach of British law to provide for legal remedies for citizens
and even permanent residents who are out of the country at the time that they are
forced into marriage (Dauvergne and Millbank 2010). Britain later introduced criminal
provisions targeting forced marriage in 2014, despite opposition from community and
feminist advocates, as well as legal redundancy.5
Public concern about forced marriages was slower to develop in the paradigmatic settler
states. Australia was the leader in this group, with the national government releasing a discussion paper on ‘Forced and Servile Marriage’ in 2010. Also in 2010, an Australian court
intervened to prevent a family taking their daughter abroad to be forcibly married. In
2013, legislation criminalising forced marriage was passed.6 In New Zealand, a petition
calling for legislative action was presented to Parliament in 2009. This led to hearings
before a Parliamentary Committee and a signiﬁcant data gathering exercise by NGOs.
In 2011 the Government responded to the Committee report by saying that further legislation would not be helpful and that it would emphasise ‘building relationships of trust
with migrant and other groups’ (Radhakrishnan 2012 at 7). In 2012 a private member’s
bill aimed at requiring court consent in order for minors to marry was introduced, but
was still on the order paper in 2015 when the government was prorogued.7 Canada’s
Department of Justice commissioned a research paper on forced marriage in 2008 (Bendriss 2008). In 2010 the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario founded a network for NGOs
in Canada dealing with forced marriage, and in 2013 the group published a survey of the
incidence of forced marriage in Canada (Anis, Konanur, and Mattoo 2013). The Canadian
government’s ﬁrst foray into this area was to publish advice for travellers on its foreign
aﬀairs webpage.8 In 2015, the government passed legislation (re-)criminalising forced
marriage, with a title that left no question about how the new law ﬁts under the Islamophobia umbrella: the ‘Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act’.9 In the United
States, where the issue of forced marriage has been politically and rhetorically overshadowed by the issue of child marriage abroad, comparatively less action has been taken.
The Tahirih Justice Centre surveyed service agencies in 2011 and reported on the prevalence of forced marriage ‘in Immigrant Communities in the United States’ (Heiman and
Smoot 2011).10
The trajectory of this concern about forced marriage is intertwined with immigration
and with Islamophobia in intricate ways. While a minority of states have made immigration law reform part of the oﬃcial response to forced marriage, immigration is intertwined
with the narrative everywhere. This intertwining begins at the deﬁnitional stage, as analysts typically set out to demarcate a clear line between forced marriage and arranged marriage.11 With some variation, these deﬁnitional eﬀorts show arranged marriage as an
accepted practice in some cultures where the marriage partners do ultimately consent
to the union, while forced marriage is a breach of human rights in which there may be
no consent at all, or where consent might be obtained by violence or coercion. This
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distinction is instructive, and emphasises the extent to which both practices are foreign to
the hegemonic unexamined Western model of marriage as a contract between two autonomous and romantically attracted individuals. The need for such care in the line drawing
exercise demonstrates the foreign-ness of the terrain, and marks the place of the putative
unintelligibility problem. In essence, the Western analytic posture is that arranged marriage is unintelligibly foreign but is acceptable because it is embedded in a non-Western
culture. It is like saying ‘we do not understand this, but we do not need to do so.’
Forced marriage, however, is viewed as being a-cultural: it is rendered understandable
by the assertion of a human rights standard. Once the practice crosses a human rights
line, legal drafters and decision makers give up on the eﬀort to understand its cultural
roots, let alone how Western immigration laws torque those roots.
This is diﬃcult terrain and risks tripping into cultural relativism. My argument is absolutely not that forced marriage ought to be respected because it is culturally grounded.
There is no evidence of this. What I am interested in is how Western regulators use unintelligibility as a way to separate arranged and forced marriage. This is not to say that
arranged marriage is in a literal sense unintelligible but rather to say that othering of cultural practices uses this device. My assertion is that because of the power of human rights
in this setting we ignore the fact that forced marriage occurs in predominantly nonWestern cultural settings, and especially as immigration disrupts those settings. Rather
than do the diﬃcult work of parsing these instances, the assertion that arranged marriage
is cultural but forced marriage is not oﬀers unintelligibility as a response.
The linkage between forced marriage and immigration is developed in several ways.
The high-proﬁle news cases have all involved communities within Western states with
strong ties to ‘elsewhere’. The instructive cases in public education material often warn
about young people who are taken to another country on the pretext of a vacation or a
visit to relatives, only to ﬁnd they are to be married while away, or about vulnerable
young people who are forced into a marriage to facilitate an immigration sponsorship.
The statistics portray a story of forced marriage linkages to communities with various
markers of minority status in Western states (Yurdakul and Korteweg 2013).
The eﬀort to separate forced marriage from arranged marriage is emphatic that these
are not practices that exist on a continuum. Indeed, government and non-governmental
organisations working on this project often emphasise that forced marriage happens
everywhere and can happen to anyone, regardless of gender, sexual identity, race, religion,
citizenship, or country of origin. The Ontario, Canada, group that completed Canada’s
ﬁrst survey of forced marriage by canvassing ‘service providers’ put it this way:
Men and women of all ages, from varied cultural religious and socio-economic backgrounds
experience FM. … FM victims come from varied backgrounds, communities, cultures, ages,
religions, etc. (Anis, Konanur, and Mattoo 2013 at 4)

This presentation is strategic, emphasising that this is a problem that ‘we’ (Australians,
Canadians, Americans, …) must confront in ‘our’ own communities. Despite this strategy,
data in every Western state producing it show that those forced into marriage are more
frequently young Muslim women than any other group. In the United Kingdom, which
has the most sophisticated governmental statistics, 80 percent of victims in 2016 were
female, and approximately 57 percent of victims came from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, all with large Muslim populations.12 The Ontario report found 92 percent women
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among 219 cases, of whom 47 percent were Muslim (the next largest group was Hindu,
followed by Sikh). The United States report also emphasised that ‘individuals facing
forced marriage in the United States are from very diverse national, ethnic and religious
backgrounds’; however, a majority were female and more than half were Muslim.13
There are advantages, disadvantages, and incredible complexities to ‘de-gendering’ the
discourse surrounding a highly gendered harm. While the politics of inclusion is certainly
vital, removing gender risks obscuring the vulnerability of being young and female and
living within a newcomer community inside a prosperous Western state. Those complexities are multiplied by presenting the practice as both de-gendered and de-linked to immigration. This posture also prevents us from focusing on the uncomfortable spectre that
immigration may itself increase the risk of forced marriage. There is persistent anecdotal
evidence now arising in a wide range of Western states that forced marriage is sometimes
used by families against young people who have ‘strayed’ too far from the traditional
values of the ‘old country’ wherever it is, or, worse, who show evidence of ‘transgressive’
sexuality (the Forced Marriage Unit in the United Kingdom has gathered evidence that
there are heightened risks of forced marriage for LGBT youth). This linkage with immigration is less straightforward than the immigration sponsorship connection, and therefore is thornier to unravel (see further Chung 2019).
Just like the security turn in immigration law, concerns about forced marriage did not
begin with 9/11. Instead, there has been a sharp increase in interest, attention, and detection since that time, which has altered a trajectory that had commenced in Western
Europe late in the twentieth century. In thinking through how we understand the question
of forced marriage, we are confronted sharply with a standoﬀ between unintelligibility and
human rights. It unfolds as follows. A ﬁrm line is drawn between arranged marriage and
forced marriage to render ‘culture’ intelligible via the tool of human rights. In other words,
while some practices, or traditions, particularly those involving women and sexuality, may
be foreign to Western law and law makers, once they cross over the line into human rights
abuse, these decision makers are no longer concerned about the cultural anchors of such
practices. This kind of analysis underpins the entire notion of human rights: that they are
held in common by everyone, and the distinctions that make us particular and individual
as human beings do not alter our entitlements. Human rights, therefore, oﬀer a solution to
the problem of putative unintelligibility. Once a practice can be understood as a human
rights abuse, one can ignore the aspects of it that are hard to understand – it is ﬁrmly
located and contained in a universe of liberal values and commitments.
Forced marriage is an easy case for the analysis of wilful unintelligibility. Fitting this
analysis around laws banning Muslim women from wearing various forms of headscarves
in a variety of settings are more complicated because it is not clear that such women are
‘oppressed’, even within their own ‘cultures’, by that practice. The headscarf controversy
has now played out across Western (e.g. France), non-Western (e.g. Turkey), settler (e.g.
Canada), and non-settler states (Wallach Scott 2007; Jones 2012; Piatti-Crocker and Tasch
2012). Its analytic challenge is profound and points directly to the problem of unintelligibility. The incomplete resolutions to this conﬂict are as varied as the form of the veil itself.
It can be no coincidence that culture, unintelligibility, and women ﬁt neatly together like a
set of nested dolls. The forced marriage context ties these questions directly to immigration and its regulation.
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There is nothing wrong, and much that is laudable, in the strong commitment to
human rights values that the battle against forced marriage demonstrates. But it is interesting and important that this struggle has ramped up at this point in time. This timing is
linked to the renewal of Islamophobia, and with it a freeing from the cultural relativism
that plagued human rights debates in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Whether or not a state chooses immigration law as a tool for combatting forced marriage, key immigration law provisions of all Western states are adaptable to this purpose.
Law reform is not required to achieve this end; it can be pursued in legal and policy
decision making via additional scrutiny of rules about marriage sponsorship, family
reuniﬁcation, and the like. More diﬃcult to achieve would be deploying these tools in a
‘neutral’ way without attention to proﬁling markers such as race, religion, age, and
country of origin (See Boucher 2019; Chung 2019; Ellermann 2019, for other examples
of the neutral rule problem). Unlike redeploying immigration law for security purposes,
it is much more politically palatable to use immigration law to protect human rights
and thus it is more complicated to bring scrutiny to these usages of the law. The British
engagement with forced marriage, which initially introduced ‘crack-down’ immigration
measures, has managed to achieve remarkable subtlety in its approaches to forced marriage, with strong engagement with feminist, immigrant, and feminist immigrant communities. But even in Britain battling forced marriage has proven scarcely possible without
reifying the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide at the core of immigration law.14
In a sense, the battle against forced marriage ﬁts directly into the fear of fundamentalist Islam. Like the security concern, concern about forced marriage can serve a justiﬁcatory purpose for public and political discourses. The ﬁght against forced
marriage can be read as a response to ‘otherness’ where law makers attempt to use
legal tools (human rights) to identify within a sea of unintelligibility particular ideas
that can be isolated, known, and sanctioned. This process is akin to what Korteweg
describes as a shallow deployment of the idea of gender equality (2017). There is
nothing to suggest that forced marriage is linked to fundamentalism, no reason to
think that it is more likely to occur in more deeply religious communities or families.
But law makers are on ﬁrm ground when they disdain it, and it adds to the construction
of a cultural abyss. Thoughtful analysis of responses to forced marriage brings us face to
face with the trope of unintelligibility. The ‘how’ of forced marriage becomes known
through human rights work, but the ‘why’ of the practice is obscured by this same
work. Considering something to be unintelligible because of culture makes is permissible not to understand it. This escape is a glimmer of the elision from a fear of fundamental Islam to a pervasive Islamophobia. Accepting that even human rights work can
contribute to cultural production of Islamophobia is an important part of grappling
with its persistence.

Lessons for human rights, gender & Islamophobia
The central challenge in drawing human rights lessons from gendering Islamophobia is to
keep all of the complication and nuance in the analysis; to somehow avoid the simpliﬁcation impulse that leads back to either cultural relativism or kneejerk responses. On the
surface of these two examples we see that in the security context, which is highly masculinised, Western analysts quickly assume knowledge (i.e. ‘we know some of these people
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are dangerous’) and human rights arguments have proven weak or inadequate. In the
forced marriage context, which is highly feminised, human rights arguments are almost
over-determinative, moving us very quickly to a response that all too often allows us to
skip over the stage of deepening our understanding of how and why this practice arises
and the uncomfortable overlaps with gender and culture. These two contexts are of
course related to the stereotypes of men as aggressors and women as victims, which
seem ampliﬁed by cultural diﬀerence. Paying attention to human rights in these settings
allows us to get beyond this rudimentary starting point. I believe there are several
lessons that can be drawn from comparing these settings.
The ﬁrst lesson is that in addition to anything else it does, Islamophobia disempowers
women. This point ﬁnds parallels in Sarah Song’s argument that studies of multiculturalism and gender often overlook how gender norms are shaped by interactions between
majority and minority cultures (2005). My claim is not as deep as Song’s because Islamophobia makes depth unnecessary. This is not a conclusion about whether Islam itself
empowers or disempowers women; it is instead a call to understand that the Western cultural production of Islam exacerbates gender inequality. The gender stereotyping of both
of these immigration law examples serves as a further layer of obfuscation. It is important
to work to unearth this, even as we work to prevent security threats and to protect vulnerable young women (and men). This means keeping all the complexity in the picture, and
owning up to the fact that living in ‘The West’ is not in itself emancipatory for young
Muslim women. It might be, of course, but it also exposes them to disempowering Islamophobia, to the villianization of their fathers and brothers and uncles, and to a threat of
forced marriage that is fuelled in part by the legal forms of Western states’ immigration
laws.
The second lesson is that advocates for human rights must confront the shortcomings
of these legal tools in order to resist provoking a response of simple withdrawal into a shell
of the very cultural relativism that the human rights paradigm seeks to reject. This will be
diﬃcult. It is not inconsonant to say that we reject forced marriage and at the same time to
admit that it is infused with culture. Much of the advocacy against forced marriage is
working so diligently at not making cultural judgments that the role culture plays is
washed out of the analysis. Taking culture out of the analysis makes it impossible to
analyze how a ﬁght against forced marriage contributes to Islamophobia. Transparency
and thoughtful engagement would be much harder to achieve, but would generate more
nuance. A nuanced analysis could, then, move beyond forced marriage and provide
insights into other immigration contexts like that of securitisation.
The unintelligibility that renders true cultural diﬀerence ‘other’, creates a platform for
the more mundane wilful lack of knowledge that is at the root of Islamophobia. Too often,
non-Muslim Westerners render Islam understandable by reducing it to a Hollywood
output. The binary reactions of the law (including human rights) are then much easier
to apply once we have smoothed over the thing we do not know or cannot understand
fully. The slide from a fear of fundamentalist terrorism into generalised Islamophobia substitutes unintelligibility for unknowability, failing to understand things that could be made
knowable.
Finally, human rights are by deﬁnition both universalistic and Western. When the
interests they protect ﬁt comfortably within a stereotypically Western cultural frame,
their appeal is ampliﬁed. This is what happens in the case of forced marriage. Human
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rights form a powerful discourse in this setting because they sever the potentially unintelligible from its ‘otherness’ and assimilate it into a familiar framework. On the other hand,
in the security setting, human rights arguments encounter more resistance. In that setting
the rights arguments run straight into the fear itself. There is no question of unintelligibility: there is instead a presumption that we know what the risk is, and therefore must
counter it. Our inability to know exactly what danger will arise and where and when
becomes part of why we accept the weakening of human rights. In the instance of
forced marriage, we ignore unintelligibility. In the security setting, we ignore what may
be knowable and instead reify unknowability as a centrepiece of the analysis.
The ﬁnal challenge is to consider what the immigration example can tell us about the
relationship between Islam and the West, which is central to so much of contemporary
immigration politics, whether played out nationally, locally, or globally. At present, this
relationship is mediated through Islamophobia and the contemporary tendency to generate a Western cultural production of Islam. The contours of Islamophobia are complicated; it does not have the same eﬀects, or the same results, or the same linkages with
human rights in every instance. But it is pernicious. Working to understand the roles Islamophobia plays in varying instances is one step towards reducing its monolithic power.
This is a starting point in moving both law making and discretionary legal decision
making away from irrational phobia.

Notes
1. On the potential futility of deﬁning Islamophobia, see Sayyid’s thoughtful introduction to
Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives (2010). Allen’s succinct discussion in
‘Still a Challenge for Us All?’ (2016) is also helpful.
2. In Australia, immigration detention used as a security tactic did not attract the same judicial
scrutiny. One reason for this absence is that Australia’s administrative detention regime for
non-citizens was already by 2001 more rigid than any other detention regime in the world. In
2004, prior to the rulings in the other states, the Australian High Court approved indeﬁnite
detention for non-citizens who were not terror risks and who could not be deported: Al-Kateb
v Godwin, [2004] HCA 37.
3. See Zaoui v Attorney-General, [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (CA); A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants)
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent); X (FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent), [2004] UKHL 56 [Belmarsh]; Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 SCR 350. While
both the New Zealand case and the British case relied heavily on international statements
of human rights, the Canadian court kept its reasoning within the parameters of Canada’s
own constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
has not been a strong source of protections for non-citizens in Canada and its interpretation
has not kept pace with international developments in key areas. See, Dauvergne (2013).
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13,
UN Doc A/810 (1948) art 16(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 art 23(3) (entered into force 23 March 1976); Convention
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 7
November 1962, 521 UNTS 231 art 1 (entered into force 9 December 1964); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 art 10
(1) (entered into force 3 January 1976); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 art 16 (entered into force 3
September 1981).
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5. Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014) (UK), c 12. The United Kingdom had
introduced legislation criminalizing forced marriage in 2006 but it was not passed.
6. Crimes Legislation Amendment (Slavery, Slavery-like Conditions and People Traﬃcking) Act
2013 (Cth), amending Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). See Australia, Attorney-General’s
Department, Criminal Justice Division, Discussion Paper: Forced and Servile Marriage
(Barton, ACT: Attorney-General’s Department, 2010); Simmons and Burn 2013.
7. New Zealand Marriage (Court Consent to Marriage of Minors) Amendment Bill 2017
(Member’s Bill – Joanne Hayes): Bills Digest No 2478, which passed its ﬁrst reading on
June 7, 2017.
8. Government of Canada (2015). The contents of this advice leave something to be desired, for
example:
If you are forced to travel abroad, you may wish to provide the following information to
someone you trust in Canada:
.
.
.
.

your contact information abroad
a photocopy of your passport photo page and birth certiﬁcate
a recent photograph of yourself
your itinerary (anticipated travel details, ﬂight information, return date).

9. Bill S-7, Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 (second
reading 23 March 2015).
10. Regarding the politics of child marriage vs forced marriage, see Millbank and Dauvergne
2011; also USAID 2014.
11. Here are some examples:
1. The SALCO Report, supra note 15 at 4, which states:
Forced/non-consensual marriage is a form of domestic violence and a global human
rights issue. FM is characterized by coercion, where individuals are forced to marry
against their will, under duress and/or without full, free and informed consent from
both parties. Men and women of all ages, from varied cultural religious and socio-economic backgrounds experience FM. FM and arranged marriage are often mistakenly
conﬂated. While arranged marriage has full, free, and informed consent of both parties
who are getting married, FM does not – Lack of consent is the critical distinguishing
factor in a forced marriage.
2. The Tahirih Report, supra note 18 at 2, which states:
An arranged marriage is not the same as a forced marriage. A forced marriage, in which
an individual feels she has no ultimate right to choose her partner and/or no meaningful
way to say no to the marriage, is distinguishable from an arranged marriage, in which the
families of both parties (or religious leaders or others) take the lead but ultimately, the
choice remains with the individual.
3. The UK Forced Marriage Unit’s (2014) at 1, which states:
There is a clear distinction between a forced marriage and an arranged marriage. In
arranged marriages, the families of both spouses take a leading role in arranging the marriage, but the choice of whether or not to accept the arrangement still remains with the
prospective spouses. However, in forced marriage, one or both spouses do not consent
to the marriage but are coerced into it. Duress can include physical, psychological,
ﬁnancial, sexual and emotional pressure. In the cases of some vulnerable adults who
lack the capacity to consent, coercion is not required for a marriage to be forced.
12. UK stats are available online: <www.gov.uk/forced-marriage>. The next countries on the list
are also Muslim majority: Somalia, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia each accounted for 1
percent or more of victims in 2016.
13. Tahirih Report. This study had even lower numbers than the Ontario study with a total of 150
individuals listed as having a religious aﬃliation (at footnote 15).
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14. A compelling example of this is the idea that the British government, as part of its forced
marriage work, will sometimes undertake ‘rescue missions’ overseas. The ﬁrst of these to
gain widespread attention involved a thirty-two-year-old Bangladeshi woman who had
been living in the United Kingdom where she had studied medicine and was working as a
trainee doctor. In August 2008, she was tricked by her family into returning to Bangladesh
where they locked her up in order to force her into a marriage she had previously rejected.
The High Court of England and Wales issued a protection order on her behalf, and with the
assistance of diplomatic oﬃcials, she was eventually brought before a court, placed in police
protection, and then returned to England. She was neither a British citizen nor a dual
national. See Bowcott and Percival (2008); Walker (2008).
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